Open protocol · Product in early access

Who gave your agent
permission to do that?

Let agents do useful work within your team's rules. Airlock checks protected tool requests routed through it, then allows, blocks or holds the action for approval before execution.

Live Gemini agent · Connected Gmail · Rules, approvals and activity

A demo login is required. Gmail is already connected to a dedicated test inbox. Watch an ordinary email send, a financial-content pattern trigger review, and a dummy credential get blocked. Request demo access.

Also explore the banking walkthrough, with scripted actions and fictional data.

The confused deputy attack

This scripted illustration shows an agent processing a document. Hidden inside: a prompt injection instructing it to wire $50,000. The agent follows the instruction.

What happens next?
Without Airlock
With Airlock
1000 / 1000 The same call yields the same verdict — a thousand times out of a thousand, whatever model is driving. Policy, not probability.

Guardrails filter content.
Airlock controls access.

Guardrails catch harmful content — “write me malware.” They cannot catch a legitimate financial operation performed by the wrong agent.

Wiring $50,000 isn’t harmful content — it’s an unauthorized action no guardrail will catch. And “we prompt it carefully” is not a control. You wouldn’t run payroll on vibes.

Guardrails

Content filter. Catches “write me malware.” Cannot distinguish authorized vs. unauthorized tool usage. Model-dependent — different LLM, different result.

Airlock

Access control. Checks who is calling, what they’re calling, whether they’re authorized. Deterministic — same answer regardless of model.

The problem isn’t hypothetical

Autonomous agents are already taking unauthorized actions in production. A sample of what’s on the public record.

0%
of orgs running agents hit a security incident this past year
0%
expect a major agent incident within 12 months
0%
of AI incidents come from prompt attacks
0%
of security budgets currently address it

Different surfaces, one pattern: an agent took an action it was never authorized to take. That’s the boundary Airlock enforces.

Three roles. Deterministic enforcement.

The same access-control architecture that banks and defense use, applied to AI agent tool calls.

Agent
Tool call
wire_funds()
PIP
Identify
Who is this agent? Cryptographic identity & trust — verified, not asserted.
PDP
Decide
Does policy allow it? Deterministic — same answer, any model.
PEP
Enforce
Allow or deny — before the tool ever runs.
Allowed
Denied
every decision → signed receipt
fintech.cedar
// Only treasury agents with high trust can wire funds permit ( principal in Role::"treasury", action == Action::"wire_funds", resource ) when { principal.trust_score >= 75 };

Define once. Enforce everywhere. No model dependency.

Every decision.
Signed. Chained. Verifiable.

Every allow and every deny produces a signed, hash-chained receipt — tamper with one and the whole chain breaks. It’s the artifact you hand an auditor.

  • Ed25519 signatures on every decision
  • SHA-256 hash chain links consecutive records
  • Arguments are hashed, not stored (privacy by design)
  • One-click chain verification in the control room
⬡ AIRLOCK PERMISSION RECEIPT DENY
{ "agent_did": "did:key:z6Mk...payments-agent", "tool": "wire_funds", "decision": "DENY", "reason": "wire_funds requires role:treasury", "policy_id": "fintech.cedar", "trust_score": 0.42, "args_digest": "sha256:a1b2c3...f9e8d7", "timestamp": "2026-06-20T14:32:01Z", "signature": "ed25519:7Qp8mN...xK4w==", "prev_hash": "sha256:d4e5f6...b3a2c1" }
$ airlock verify-receipt  ·  ✓ signature valid  ·  ✓ chain intact

A badge your customers can verify.

Every agent you run through Airlock earns a verifiable badge — show partners and auditors that its actions are permission-controlled, and let them check it themselves. No trust required.

Rolling out with our first design partners.

⬡
AIRLOCK
VERIFIED
✓ actions permission-controlled
⬡  Permission-controlled by Airlock ✓

Built on standards you already trust

Open-source foundation. Enterprise-grade enforcement built on top.

Ed25519 OAuth 2.1 W3C DID RFC 8693 AWS Cedar SHA-256 MCP
v1.0
Released
1,087
Tests
Python + TS
SDKs
Open core
Apache-2.0 SDKs

Deploy the agents you’ve been
too careful to ship.

An airlock doesn’t exist to keep you in. It exists so you can go out — farther, faster, repeatedly. Airlock is in early access; we work directly with design partners to put deterministic control under ambitious agents.